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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GROUP LIBEL LAW UPHELD
As founder and president of the White Circle League, defendant
circulated a virulent leaflet in the form of a petition to the mayor and
city council of the City of Chicago advocating racial segregation and
seeking new members to the League. Defendant was convicted in the
Municipal Court of Chicago for violating an Illinois statute' which
forbids any person from publishing any lithograph which portrays a
lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or religion.
The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the conviction on the ground
that the language was designed to breed hatred against a race, and that
the statute under which the conviction was obtained did not violate the
right of freedom of speech as guaranteed by the State and Federal Con-
stitutions. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Illinois
court. Beaubarnais v. People, 72 S. Ct. 725 (1952).
In libeling an individual or a group, one may be subject to a civil
suit or criminal prosecution, or both. The gravamen of a civil suit for
libel is damages,2 while the gravamen of a criminal prosecution is the
tendency to foment a breach of the peace.3 One who libels a large
group is not subject to civil liability unless special application of the
defamatory matter to an individual member of the group can be shown.4
Defamation of a small group will give rise to a right of action by each
member of the group if the language applies to each member as an
I "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture, sell, or
offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state
any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama or sketch, which publication or exhibi-
tion portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citi-
zens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition ex-
poses the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or
obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots . M." IlL Rev. Stat.
(1951) c. 38, S 471.
2Hughes v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 312 Mass. 178, 43 N.E. 2d 657
(1942); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S.W. 2d 246 (1942); Fahy v.
Melrose Free Press, 298 Mass. 267, 10 N.E. 2d 187 (1937).
3 Annenberg v. Coleman, 121 Fla. 133, 163 So. 405 (1935); State v. Gardner, 112
Conn. 121, 151 Atl. 349 (1930); People v. Spielman, 318 Ill. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925).
However, it has been held by some states that injury to reputation is the gravamen of
both civil and criminal libel actions. See Tanenhaus, Group Libel, 35 Cornell L.Q. 261,
273, and n. 67 (1950).
4Hospital Care Corporation v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 194 S.C. 370, 9 S.E.
2d 796 (1940); Ewell v. Boutwell, 138 Va. 402, 121 S.E. 912 (1924); Lynch v. Stan-
dard Pub. Co., 51 Utah 322, 170 Pac. 770 (1918).
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individual, and not solely to the group as a unit. If, however, the group
is so small that the libel necessarily applies to each member, each has
a cause of action.5 It is also possible for a civil suit to be brought in the
name of the defamed group itself, such as a partnership or corporation.
Though business organizations can suffer no mental pain or humiliation,
they can incur business losses, and, thus, they have access to the courts for
pecuniary damages.6 Unincorporated groups generally meet grave pro-
cedural difficulties in attempting such a suit.7 Therefore, the libeler of a
large group has almost no fear of a civil action.
Libel of an individual was a common law crime, and, at common
law, truth or good motives was not available as a defense.8 This defense
was subsequently made available in most states, and today, libel directed
at an individual is punishable in every American jurisdiction.9
In all criminal prosecutions for libel, the police power of the state
limits, in some manner, the individual's right to free expression.
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Con-
stitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality. "Retort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitu-
tion, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that
instrument." 10
However, a serious constitutional question is presented when the
libel is directed at a large group rather than at an individual, in that
group libel laws might be used to control the discussion of public issues
and the individual's right to free expression.
5 Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 125 W. Va. 731, 26 S.E. 2d 209 (1943);
Reilly v. Curtiss, 83 N.J.L. 77, 84 At. 199 (S. Ct., 1912); Goldborough v. Orem &
Johnson, 103 Md. 671, 64 Atd. 36 (1906); Wofford v. Meeks, 129 Ala. 349, 30 So. 625
(1901).
6 Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local Union No. 2928 of United Steelworkers
of America, 152 F. 2d 493 (C.A. 7th, 1945); Finnish Temperance Soc. Sovittaja v.
Publishing Co., 238 Mass. 345, 130 N.E. 845 (1921); Interstate Optical Co. v. Illinois
State Soc. of Optometrists, 244 Ill. App. 158 (1927).
7 But see Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, 287 N.Y. 373, 39 N.E. 2d 919
(1942).
8 Prosser, Torts S 95 (1941).
9 For a complete listing of statutes covering criminal libel, consult Beauharnais v.
People, 72 S. Ct. 725, 730 n. 5 (1952).
10 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940). These words were also used
by the court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)
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There have been successful prosecutions for the libel of groups such
as the Knights of Columbus11 and the American Legion, 12 but no prose-
cutions for the libel of a large race or religion have been successfully
carried to completion prior to the instant case.
The majority of the Court reasoned that the "due process" clause
of the United States Constitution does not prevent a state from punish-
ing a libel directed at "designated collectivities," and that:
. . . if an utterance directed at an individual may be the object of criminal
sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same utterance di-
rected at a defined group, unless we can say that this is a wilful and purposeless
restricton unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State.13
Having classified the utterances in this case in the same category
as those of an obscene or profane nature, the Court reasoned that since
no one would contend that a "clear and present danger" need be shown
to curb the latter types of speech, none need be shown to punish libelous
matter directed at a group.
The "clear and present danger" doctrine, which the majority opinion
said was not applicable to the present case, was first enunciated by
Justice Holmes in Scbenck v. United States.1 4 In reviewing a conviction
for circulating pamphlets urging resistance to the draft of World War
I, Justice Holmes said that the individual's right to free speech could
be restricted by the authority of the state only in situations where the
words used were of such a nature as to create a "clear and present
danger" to the state. This "clear and present danger" rule was not applied
in the next important decision involving freedom of speech, which was
Gitlow v. New York. 15 In that case the defendant was convicted for
the violation of a New York statute prohibiting the advocacy of the
forceful overthrow of the government. The conviction was affirmed on
the theory that the test was not applicable "when the legislative body
has determined ... that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger
of substantive evil that they may be punished .... ,,16 However, the Gitlow
case has been looked upon as an exception to the Scbenck case and the
"clear and present danger" doctrine has been "used in over twenty-five
decisions of the Supreme Court."'17
11 Alumbaugh v. State, 39 Ga. App. 766, 147 S.E. 714 (1929); People v. Gordon, 63
Cal. App. 627, 219 Pac. 486 (1923); Crane v. State, 14 Okla. Crim. Rep. 30, 166 Pac.
1110 (1917); People v. Turner, 28 Cal. App. 766, 154 Pac. 34 (1915).
12 People v. Spielman, 318 Ill. 482, 149 N.E. 466 (1925).
13 Beauharnais v. People, 72 S. Ct. 725, 731 (1952).
14249 U.S. 47 (1919).
15 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 16 Ibid., at 670.
17 Schmandt, The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine, I St. Louis Univ. L. J. 265,
268 (1951).
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In the recent case of Dennis v. United States,18 the doctrine was modi-
fied to include words which create a high probability of serious danger
in the future, though they did not constitute a present threat. Although
the Court in the Beauharnais case refused to consider the application of
the doctrine, Justices Douglas and Jackson, dissenting, believed that
the doctrine was essential to the determination of the case and that no
conviction could be maintained unless the words actually did create
a "clear and present danger." Of this doctrine, Justice Jackson said, "It
is the most just and workable standard yet evolved for determining
criminality of words whose injurious or inciting tendencies are not
demonstrated by the event but are ascribed to them on the basis of
probability."'19
One other objection to the majority opinion in the instant case was
that the statute is too broad; that the words "virtue," "derision,"
and "obloquy" may "permit within their scope the punishment of
incidents secured by the guarantee of free speech, ' 20 such as the criti-
cism of political parties. In answer to this, the majority stated, " 'While
this court sits' it retains and exercises authority to nullify action which
encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel."
21
The fact that the leaflet in question was in the form of a petition was
brought up in dissent as a factor which might have brought the publica-
tion within the privilege to petition the government for a redress of
grievances or as a valid discussion of a public issue. It was felt that this
issue should have been specifically passed upon by the court, if not
actually submitted to the jury for consideration.
In regard to the defense of truth and good motives, which is provided
for by the Illinois Constitution '2 2 the defendant's proffer of evidence as
to the possible truth of the matter published was rejected by the trial
court. As the defendant had made no attempt to prove the other requisite
of the defense, namely, good motives, the majority of the Court felt that
the offer of proof did not satisfy the entire requirements of the Illinois
statute, and that, therefore, the defendant's rights were not impaired by
the refusal of the evidence offered. 23 However, Justice Reed was of
the opinion that the defendant was justified in not going "through the
Is 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
1 Beauharnais v. People, 72 S. Ct. 725, 754 (1952).
20 Ibid., at 744.
21 Ibid., at 734.
22 I11. Const. Art. II, § 4.
22 In order for the defense of truth to prevail in Illinois, the law requires that
the truth of all facts of the utterance must be shown together with good motives
for publication. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 38, § 404; People v. Strauch, 247 I11. 220,
93 N.E. 126 (1910); People v. Fuller, 238 Ill. 116, 87 N.E. 336 (1909).
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useless ceremony of offering proof"24 of good motives after his offer
to prove truth was rejected. Although Justice Reed did not think that
the defendant had any probability of proving the defense, he believed
his evidence should have been admitted and evaluated. 25
In upholding as constitutional, for the first time, a group libel statute,
the Beauharnais decision seems to solve, in part, the question of whether
such statutes conflict with the right of free speech. This case may, how-
ever, be limited in application by future decisions, which, by the reason-
ing of the majority in the instant case, must be decided in the light of
the particular wording of the statute and factual situation involved.
Though the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, it was
made clear that their finding "carries no implication of approval of the
wisdom of the legislation or of its efficacy."26 However, the decision
is in line with the modern tendency to subordinate the rights of the indi-
vidual where, in the Court's opinion, it seems necessary to protect the
interests of a large group.
It is interesting to note that the Beauharnais case seems to fall into
the pattern of the Gitlow case, in that it gives great weight to the
legislative deliberations of the state rather than following the more
recent trend which applies the "clear and present danger" doctrine
as exemplified by the Dennis case. It is impossible, of course, to predict
with any degree of accuracy the repercussions of this case, but it may
be relied on in deciding other cases limiting individual rights in favor
of group interests, and, thus, it should be closely scrutinized before
being applied.
TORTS-RECOVERY FOR PRENATAL INJURIES
Plaintiff was en ventre sa mere during the ninth month of pregnancy
when the mother fell down the stairs in defendant's multiple dwelling
house. As a result of the fall, plaintiff came into this world permanently
maimed and disabled. As a defense to the charge of negligence, defendant
relied on a precedent in New York which had refused to allow recovery
for an injury sustained before birth.' The New York Court of Appeals
reversed a judgment in favor of defendant 2 and granted damages to
plaintiff. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951).
24 Beauharnais v. People, 72 S. Ct. 725, 752 (1952).
25 In 61 Yale L.J. 252, 260 (1952), is expressed the fear that".., giving the defendants
the chance to argue the 'truth' of their hate canards would make the trials sounding-
boards for their propaganda. Such 'prosecutions' might be warmly welcomed by
professionals."
26 Beauharnais v. People, 72 S.Ct. 725, 736 (1952).
1 Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); cf. In re Robert's Estate,
158 N.Y. Misc. 698, 286 N.Y. Supp. 476 (Surr. Ct., 1936).
2 Woods v. Lancet, 278 App. Div. 913, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 417 (1951).
